# Advance Questions for John P. Stenbit Nominee for the Position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)

#### 1. Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.

Question: Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

<u>Answer</u>: Yes, I whole-heartedly support full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols and Special Operations reforms.

Question: What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

<u>Answer</u>: I am not yet fully familiar with the Department's efforts to implement these reforms. However, if confirmed, I will review the extent to which these reforms have been implemented and assess appropriate actions I can take to promote further implementation.

Question: What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

<u>Answer</u>: It is my understanding that these reforms have significantly improved the organization of the Department of Defense, focused our joint warfighting capabilities, enhanced the military advice received by the Secretary of Defense and provided for more efficient and effective use of defense resources in responding to national security challenges.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Question: Do you agree with these goals?

<u>Answer</u>: Yes, I agree with these goals.

Recently, there have been articles which indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

<u>Question</u>: Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

<u>Answer:</u> My understanding is that the Department is continuing to examine ways to better support the goals of the reform in light of our ever-changing environment. If confirmed, I will fully support the intent of the reforms and advocate legislative proposals and policies that will enhance the Department's ability to respond to national security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

## 2. Duties

<u>Question</u>: What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my principal duty will be to advise the Secretary of Defense on space and information superiority. I will exercise policy, guidance, planning, resource management and program oversight of mission areas.

<u>Question</u>: What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer: I have over 30 years of practical and managerial engineering experience in the defense industry and with the DoD. As an industry executive I was ultimately responsible for fulfilling corporate obligations on a myriad of defense contracts ensuring successful program delivery to the government and a reasonable profit for our employees and shareholders. I saw and experienced both the best and worst in DoD program management and execution. If confirmed, I will consider and recommend any changes that might improve the organizational process.

I received both my undergraduate and master's degree in electrical engineering from CalTech and was later fortunate enough to study and teach for two years as a Fulbright and Aerospace Corporation Fellow at the Technische Hogeschool in the Netherlands.

In addition to the four years that I served in the Pentagon as a DoD employee I have also

served on Defense Science Boards, Air Force and Navy Study Boards, Science Advisory Groups for Naval Intelligence and the Defense Communications Agency (now DISA), S & T Panel Chairman for the Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of an Advisory Committee for the Federal Aviation Administration Administrator.

I believe that my education, government and industry experience, and successful, executive level defense industry career have prepared me to face the exciting challenges and opportunities resident in the position of ASD C3I.

<u>Question</u>: Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)?

<u>Answer</u>: I am unaware of any specific actions that I should take to further prepare myself for the position as ASD C3I.

<u>Question</u>: Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

<u>Answer</u>: The ASD C3I is principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for space and information superiority. As DOD's Chief Information Officer, the ASD C3I is also responsible for oversight of all DOD information systems and information management activities.

Question: Are these roles --advocate, operator and overseer -- in conflict?

<u>Answer</u>: I am aware of the debate regarding the ASD C3I and the DoD CIO being dual-hatted. If confirmed, I will solicit views on both sides, analyze the pros and cons, and develop my position based largely on what is in the best interest of the Department.

Question: Do you believe the CIO function should be separated from the ASD C3I position?

<u>Answer</u>: It is my understanding that there are cogent arguments for and against separation. This issue merits a more in-depth study and assessment of the benefits and impacts. If confirmed, I will examine the pros and cons and offer a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on a way ahead.

Question: In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

A. The Secretary of Defense

Answer: If confirmed, I will function as DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and as the

principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all space and information superiority matters. In particular I will be responsible for providing policy, guidance and oversight for functions including:

- ?? Command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors;
- ?? Information technology, management, operations, assurance, and superiority;
- ?? Electronic commerce and business process reform;
- ?? Intelligence and counterintelligence;
- ?? Personnel, industrial, and classification security;
- ?? Frequency-spectrum management;
- ?? Space systems; and,
- ?? Critical infrastructure protection.

## B. The Deputy Secretary of Defense

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense will be the same as that described above in relation to the Secretary of Defense.

#### C. The Under Secretaries of Defense

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my relationship with the Under Secretaries of Defense and other senior officials of the Department will be based on the role of each principal official within the Department of Defense with respect to my functions as described above in the relationship to the Secretary of Defense. With respect to acquisition of information superiority and space systems, I will report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

#### D. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict will be similar to that described below in relation to the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense. In particular, I will coordinate the Psychological Operations aspect of Information Operations.

#### E. The other Assistant Secretaries of Defense

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my relationship with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and other senior officials of the Department will be based on the role of each principal official within the Department of Defense with respect to my functions as described above in the relationship to the Secretary of Defense.

#### F. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my relationship with the General Counsel will be based on my role as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for space and information superiority matters and as DoD CIO.

#### G. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I will continue to coordinate and exchange information with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on space and information superiority matters to ensure all policy and guidance issues under my cognizance are supportive of the Commanders-in-Chief and Military Services.

## H. The Commander-in-Chief United States Special Operations Command

Answer: If confirmed, my relationship with the Commander-in-Chief United States Special Operations Command will be based on my role as the CIO and as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for space and information superiority functions. I will coordinate and exchange information with the Commander-in-Chief United States Special Operations Command and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on matters of mutual interest to ensure policy and guidance matters under my cognizance are supportive of the CINC's roles and missions.

#### I. The regional combatant CINCS

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my relationship with the regional combatant CINCs will be based on my role as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for space and information superiority functions and as CIO, and I will coordinate and exchange information with the CINCs on matters of mutual interest to ensure management policy and guidance are supportive of the CINCs' roles and missions.

#### J. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed as the Secretary of Defense's principal staff assistant for space and information superiority functions, I will exercise authority, direction and control over the, Defense Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, I will work with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that their space and information superiority programs follow DoD guidance in the areas of architecture, interoperability, security, acquisition and related areas.

#### K. The Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed as the Secretary of Defense's principal staff assistant for space and information superiority functions, I will exercise oversight of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Accordingly, I will work with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that their space and information superiority programs follow DoD guidance in the areas of architecture, interoperability, security, acquisition and related areas.

## L. The Director of the National Security Agency

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed as the Secretary of Defense's principal assistant for space and information superiority functions, I will exercise oversight of the National Security Agency. Accordingly, I will work with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that their space and information superiority programs follow DoD guidance in the areas of architecture, interoperability, security, acquisition and related areas.

## M. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I will coordinate and exchange information with the Under Secretary of the Air Force on space and information superiority matters particularly relating to space matters, appropriate to ensure all policy and guidance issues under my cognizance are supportive of the Commanders-in-Chief and Military Services.

# 3. Major Challenges and Problems

Question: In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, one of my major challenges will be to help the Department achieve space and information superiority. Information needs to be seen as a strategic asset rather than a supporting element.

I believe that key challenges include: promoting secure, reliable, interoperable solutions that break down stovepipes and enable joint and coalition operations, transforming business practices to accelerate acquisition and development to keep pace with commercial world, changing the mind set throughout DoD to examine and incorporate transformational concepts, ensuring intelligence capabilities keep pace with the emerging threats, paying more attention to people and protecting critical cyber and physical infrastructures, information, and advance technologies.

Question: Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I will ensure that ASD C3I is properly organized to address these challenges. In coordination with my counterparts elsewhere in the Department, I will develop a strategy for addressing each of these areas and implement it through policy, planning guidance, and effective oversight.

<u>Question</u>: What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I will look to address the following:

- ?? Need to reform business practices for the information age;
- ?? Be able to acquire key IT on commercial time scales;
- ?? *Need to leverage the limited numbers of acquisition professionals within C3I;*
- ?? *Need to fix outdated IT infrastructure within OSD.*

Question: If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my focus will be on creating management mechanisms and metrics to transform the military in space, intelligence, information operations and assurance, C3 and IT.

#### 4.Priorities

<u>Question</u>: If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my priorities will be to implement actions to achieve space and information superiority.

## 5. Information Superiority

Many have described the major responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) as "information superiority."

Question: Describe your vision of information superiority for DOD, including any major impediments to information superiority facing the Department.

<u>Answer</u>: To me, information superiority means the right information, to the right place and the right people, at the right time, assured and protected while denying our

adversaries the same.

#### 6. Information Operations

Joint Vision 2020 and most defense experts advocate "information superiority" as a critical element of success in 21<sup>st</sup> Century conflict. Disrupting the information systems of adversaries, while protecting our own systems from disruption (i.e., information operations) may well be a major element of warfare in the future.

<u>Question</u>: Describe your vision for the role of information operations in the conduct of military operations.

Answer: It is my understanding that as discussed in Joint Vision 2020 and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the vision is to evolve Information Operations from a supportive capability to a "core" capability and a mission area not unlike air, land, sea, and fully integrated into the full spectrum of military operations. I believe we should continue to evolve our capabilities, enabling us to shape the information environment and provide pre-conflict management courses of action. If conflicts arise, we will ensure that IO capabilities will integrate with our traditional kinetic force capabilities.

<u>Question</u>: What is your assessment of the unity of the efforts across the Department, the Defense Agencies and the respective military services in this area?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I will review this topic aggressively. I feel that there are well meaning, dedicated professionals working for the best interests of their organizations or programs. And, as IO continues to evolve within DoD, I believe we should look for refinements in how the Department organizes to plan and execute IO.

#### 7. Information Assurance

The vulnerability of Department of Defense information systems has been repeatedly demonstrated. The protection of our critical information infrastructure has become a high priority. Training and retention of personnel in this developing profession of computer security and infrastructure protection has been challenging.

<u>Question</u>: Are you satisfied with the current level of effort to protect critical Department of Defense information infrastructures?

Answer: I believe that the Department has made significant progress over the past

few years to protect its information infrastructure, however, protection of defense information infrastructure is an ongoing effort that will never reach a final conclusion. Not only can we not rest on our laurels, but also we need to find new ways to do business to respond more rapidly. If confirmed, this will be a focus area.

<u>Question</u>: Have sufficient resources been allocated for this task in the President's budget request for defense?

<u>Answer</u>: For Information Assurance, it is my understanding that there are sufficient resources allocated for protection of our information infrastructure. That does not mean that an increase in resources would not improve the situation – clearly it would. But resource needs for this task must be balanced against other critical requirements.

<u>Question</u>: What are your views on the professional development and retention of the highly skilled personnel required to assure the security of our Department of Defense information systems?

<u>Answer</u>: I believe that in DoD, as in most organizations, development and retention of skilled people is a critical task and one of the most challenging. It is my understanding that the DoD has been making strides to identify and improve the management of these critical personnel, but there is a lot of work to be done, especially in the development and retention arenas. We can't employ technical solutions without the trained personnel to implement them and operate the networks correctly.

In Section 922 of the FY2001 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act, an Information Security Scholarship Program was authorized. The purpose of this program is "to encourage the recruitment and retention of Department of Defense personnel who have the computer and network security skills necessary to meet Department of Defense information assurance requirements."

Question: What is the status of implementation of this program?

Answer: It is my understanding that this upcoming Academic Year 2001–2002 will serve as a pilot year in which the Department will prototype programs at schools that have been designated by DoD as Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. These will provide scholarships with internships for non-DoD students at these institutions, as well as scholarships for current DoD civilian employees and military members, in exchange for a period of obligated service with the Department as provided for by the statute. These prototype approaches will be evaluated for cost effectiveness

and management efficiencies, and lessons learned will be incorporated into program planning for future years. A request for proposal has been released to the 23 institutions designated as Centers of Academic Excellence and DoD is awaiting their response.

## 8. Responsibilities in Space

In the past, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) has been assigned the lead within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for military space matters. With the realignment of responsibilities identified by the Secretary of Defense in implementing the recommendations of the Space Commission, it is not clear exactly what role the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) will have in oversight of military space matters.

Question: Please describe the role you will fill in overseeing military space matters if you are confirmed.

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, it is my understanding that my role would be to ensure appropriate senior-level policy, guidance, oversight, and advocacy for space. I will work closely with the Heads of DoD Components in carrying out my responsibilities.

Question: Please describe the most significant challenges facing the Department of Defense and the intelligence community in providing space support to the war fighter.

<u>Answer</u>: With respect to challenges facing the United States, the DoD is increasingly dependent on its civil, commercial, and defense and intelligence space assets. With that dependence comes vulnerability to hostile acts. The nation needs a capability to deter attack on space assets, and systems to defend satellites in orbit, the ground stations that control them, and the electronic links between them.

The U.S. and other nations that make use of space face real threats to the operations of their satellites. We know that other nations have jammed telecommunications, that Russian entities market devices that can jam GPS signals, and that foreign satellites manufacturers market so-called "micro satellites" to other foreign countries that can be used for offensive actions against satellites. In light of U.S. dependence on vulnerable space assets, it would be contrary to U.S. security interests not to develop, test, and deploy the means of deterring attack on and defending space systems.

In addition, U.S. space capabilities must be modernized to support our 21<sup>st</sup> century needs. Space is critical to strengthening our intelligence, to serve both our short-term and our long-term national security needs. If confirmed, I will personally make establishing a strong spirit of cooperation between the Department of Defense and the rest of the

intelligence community, under the leadership of the DCI, one of my top priorities. I believe we must strengthen our intelligence and our space capabilities, along with the ability to protect those assets against various forms of attack.

## 9. Funding Challenges

During testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, the previous incumbent in the position for which you have been nominated indicated that the Department of Defense faced significant funding shortfalls in the area of information assurance.

Question: What is your opinion of the status of the Department's information assurance program?

<u>Answer</u>: It is my understanding that the program is in relatively good shape, but there is always room for improvement – especially in a field were technology is changing rapidly, the threat is enabled by this same technology, and the operational concepts are still maturing. I believe there are improvements that have to be made with how we manage and retain our people, how fast we develop and deploy information assurance technology, and how we operationalize that technology.

<u>Question</u>: If you believe that there are shortfalls, and assuming you are confirmed, will you seek increases in funding in this area as part of future budget preparations?

<u>Answer</u>: It is my understanding that this issue is being addressed as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. I believe that additional resources for information assurance must, of course, be balanced against other critical Department requirements.

## 10. Smart Cards

In November 1999 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed all Department of Defense (DOD) components to implement the use of a standard smart card containing integrated circuit chips, magnetic stripes and bar codes for use as the Department-wide common access card and as a Public Key Infrastructure authentication device, and assigned responsibility for this program to the DOD Chief Information Officer. To date the Department has not fully implemented the deployment of this technology.

Question: If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take to provide central direction to fully implement the use of smart card technology within DOD?

Answer: It is my understanding that the Department is embarked on an aggressive and

accelerated program to implement smart card technology as a common access card. Smart card technology can be used in many areas to do the business of the Department smarter and faster while providing security for our classified information and the proprietary property of our business partners. I feel that the application of smart card technology will contribute to the Department's efforts to transform business processes, enhance missions, increase security, reduce costs, and improve quality of life.

Understandably, implementation of such cutting-edge technology in a large, worldwide organization takes time and has many challenges. Nonetheless, if confirmed, I would support the implementation of this technology in the Department. To this end, I would direct my attention to the implementation plan of the program to ensure the Department is leveraging the many smart card technologies.

<u>Question</u>: Do you believe that the Navy, which has served as the lead agency for development of this technology, should be designated as the executive agent for smart cards within DOD?

<u>Answer</u>: My understanding is that the Navy is working diligently as the lead for the development of the smart card technology in the Department. This and continued significant progress in this program would certainly be important factors in any consideration of a designee for executive agency. If confirmed, I will work quickly to consider this decision.

# 11. Navy/Marine Corps Intranet Program

The Committee understands that there may be differences of opinion within the Department about the pace at which the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) program is proceeding. At least some of these differences appear to focus on the extent of testing that must be conducted to ensure that the program is ready to proceed to broader implementation.

Question: What are your views on the appropriate level or duration of testing the Department should conduct on the NMCI program?

<u>Answer</u>: I believe that systems such as NMCI must demonstrate that the capabilities satisfy user requirements and that interoperability with military systems are fully demonstrated. It is my understanding that the ASD C3I staff is currently working with Director Operational Test and Evaluation, and other OSD offices to develop a final test strategy that is consistent with a reasonable fielding rate for NMCI.

## 12. Intelligence Programs

With the development of increasingly advanced information technologies, and the evolving role of

intelligence in support of military forces and operations, the current intelligence categories -- NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA -- appear to be increasingly blurred.

Question: In your view, should these categories be reevaluated?

<u>Answer</u>: I agree. There is a blurring of these categories. I feel that it may be useful to revamp our intelligence categories to more effectively focus on the customer and mission capabilities.

<u>Question</u>: Do you believe that the current management and budgeting oversight of these programs between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence is adequate?

<u>Answer</u>: I believe the existing legislation is adequate. Nonetheless, if confirmed, I would like to study this issue in more detail before I make any recommendations for change.

Question: If not, what changes would you recommend?

Answer: N/A

<u>Question</u>: In your view, do the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have sufficient influence over major programmatic and architecture decisions within the National Foreign Intelligence Program?

<u>Answer</u>: I have no knowledge of the effectiveness of this influence, but it is certainly critical that it be effective. If confirmed, I'll work to enhance communication and improve the quality of the budget dialog to reach consensus with the DCI in this important area. I look forward to engaging on these issues if confirmed.

## 13. Oversight of Modernization of Intelligence Programs

There have been continuing questions about whether the National Security Agency (NSA) will be able to modernize signals intelligence mission capabilities to respond to new intelligence challenges.

The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2001 directed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), the Director of Central Intelligence's Senior Acquisition Executive and the Director of NSA to establish a disciplined acquisition strategy with strong oversight mechanisms for NSA's modernization program. In part, this direction resulted from concerns about NSA's capability to implement better acquisition management techniques and conduct rigorous, enterprise-wide systems engineering.

In addition, recent conflicts have illustrated continuing deficiencies in the area of map production, analysis, and dissemination. Unfortunately, there have also been questions about the ability of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to manage and implement a major modernization and transformation of its capabilities.

<u>Question</u>: What is your view of the appropriate oversight role that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) should play in management of major acquisition programs at NSA and NIMA?

Answer: I believe that the ASD C3I oversight role is to ensure that appropriate acquisition processes are in place and executed to ensure the successful delivery of the NSA and NIMA programs so critical to our nations security. For NSA and NIMA acquisition programs, the ASD C3I staff has worked extensively with the DCI's Senior Acquisition Executive. If confirmed, I will actively work with my DCI counterpart to build on the progress made to date.

## 14. Commercial vs Military Requirements for Frequency Spectrum

In recent years, growing demands for the use of the frequency spectrum for defense and civilian communication needs have increased the competition for this finite resource.

<u>Question</u>: If confirmed, what would be your role in spectrum management issues within the Department of Defense?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my responsibility in spectrum management is to ensure DoD has assured access to the necessary spectrum it needs to conduct operations and warfighter training to effectively execute those operational missions.

<u>Question</u>: If confirmed, would you represent the Department of Defense (DOD) in interagency and international negotiations regarding spectrum management issues?

Answer: Yes.

<u>Question</u>: What steps would you recommend the Department of Defense take to improve its spectrum management policies?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I would make one of my highest priorities the review of current policies and processes, and the development of a strategy to make full use of emerging spectrum-efficient technologies.

Question: If confirmed, what actions would you take to review the Department's total spectrum

requirements and ensure that new systems are designed to ensure efficient spectrum utilization by the Department of Defense?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, I expect to update requirements projections and to identify solutions that include new spectrum-efficient technologies.

Question: What do you see as the proper balance between defense and other uses of the frequency spectrum, and what is your view of the current process by which those needs are balanced?

<u>Answer</u>: Although I am not familiar with the details, I understand the current process for spectrum allocation provides equal opportunity to both the private sector and our government to request and debate frequency spectrum based upon requirements. If confirmed, I will continue to support this process.

Question: What are your views of proposals to reallocate spectrum in the 1755-1850 frequency band from DOD and other federal users to make this band available for third-generation internet (3G) use?

<u>Answer</u>: Although I am not completely familiar with all the details of this issue, it is important to protect the military capabilities that need the 1755-1850 MHz band. If additional spectrum is needed, I would encourage exploring all alternative bands and I will, if confirmed, work with concerned parties to help us reach the best decision for the nation on this matter.

<u>Question</u>: If confirmed, what actions would you take if the study currently being conducted within the Department of Defense determines that there will be a significant cost and operational impact if the military services surrender the 1755 - 1850 MHZ band of frequencies?

<u>Answer</u>: If I understand correctly, studies have already indicated the defense of our nation is at risk by vacating this spectrum. If confirmed, I will work with other branches to help determine the best decision for the nation on this matter.

<u>Question</u>: Do you believe that potential solutions exist that would allow DOD to shift to other frequency bands, assuming sufficient funding were available to compensate DOD for its relocation costs?

<u>Answer</u>: I understand this is a matter that is still under study. If confirmed, I will work with the spectrum regulators to determine if potential solutions exist that would allow DoD to shift to other frequency bands.

#### 15. Information Management

In 1995, GAO designated the Department of Defense effort to streamline business operations and deploy more efficient standard information systems as a "high-risk" area, indicating that it was especially vulnerable to waste and mismanagement. Since 1995, GAO has continually reported that the Department of Defense has lacked effective management and oversight controls of the information technology (IT) investments. The areas of concern include controls and processes to:

- 1) ensure that the costs and risks of multimillion-dollar projects are justified;
- 2) monitor progress and performance; and
- 3) stop projects shown to be cost ineffective or technically flawed.

A significant change in the Department of Defense IT management and oversight process occurred in July 1998 when the Department of Defense disestablished the Major Automated Information Review Council which was the primary body for overseeing major automated information systems and other IT investments.

Question: What is the status of efforts to improve the Department of Defense IT oversight process?

<u>Answer</u>: I understand the implementation of the Paperwork Reduction and Clinger-Cohen Acts provides a strong statutory foundation for IT oversight. I support the progress the Department has made in building on that foundation by developing information and oversight controls in areas such as capital planning and investment, acquisition regulation revisions, major acquisition programs, and mission critical systems tracking.

The Department of Defense reported on December 1, 1998 to the Defense Committees that the Department recognizes that its current IT management process has the following shortfalls:

- 1) minimal linkage between IT investments and functional process changes;
- 2) individual systems narrowly focused on specific functions and organizations rather than mission; and
- 3) fragmented systems and infrastructure, resulting in a lack of fully integrated and interoperable capabilities.

Question: Please comment on each of these problems and explain what the Department of Defense is doing to correct them.

<u>Answer</u>: The Clinger-Cohen Act calls for the need to improve management processes, including the selection and management of IT resources. It is my understanding that DoD is developing an investment portfolio process to improve investment oversight for families of systems. This process would establish direct links between IT investment decisions and DoD mission priorities -- not only those of individual organizations -- ensuring functional outcomes as well as compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act and related reform legislation. Portfolio management and oversight would also promote synchronized development of individual systems and their supporting infrastructures.

By the same token, I feel that the Global Information Grid (GIG) policy and implementation should significantly improve the interoperability and integration of DoD's IT communications and computing infrastructure. In essence, GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support personnel. This overarching model will provide at once, a blueprint and an overlay for the development, implementation and integration of dependent and sub- architectures. By using or building to this model, the Department and its components will be able to overcome much of the fragmentation and narrowly focused IT solutions.

The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 introduced requirements emphasizing the need for the Department of Defense to significantly improve management processes, including how it selects and manages IT resources. For instance, a key goal of the Clinger-Cohen Act is that the Department of Defense should have institutionalized processes and information in place to ensure that IT projects are being implemented at acceptable costs, within reasonable time frames, and are contributing to tangible, observable improvements in mission performance.

Question: What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the Clinger-Cohen Act?

Answer: As I understand it from a brief review, the Department's approach to implementing the Act has been one that builds on past successes and seizes the opportunities the Act offers to reinvent and reinvigorate how information is delivered to warfighters and those who support them. Specifically, it is my understanding that the Department:

- ?? Established a governance structure that fosters a more collaborative approach to policy-making and IT budgeting.
- ?? Uses the Planning, Programming and Budget System in conjunction with the requirements and acquisition processes, to ensure that the correct information

investments are selected. Changes have been made in the budget process to ensure full participation of the DoD CIO in the decision making process.

- ?? Included procedures for implementing the Clinger-Cohen Act and related legislation in the most recent version of its acquisition regulations.
- ?? Made significant progress on actions to manage its worldwide information infrastructure as a coherent GIG, including the development of an IT architecture with operational, systems and technical views that can be applied to IT investment decisions.
- ?? Has a Defense-wide Information Assurance Program to build and sustain a secure information infrastructure.
- ?? Is engaged in a number of initiatives to improve the processes for recruiting, hiring, retaining and training information technology professionals.

## 16. Automation and Management Reform

GAO and others have criticized various DOD's business units (such as finance, accounting, personnel, inventory, transportation) for failing to change their business processes to take advantage of new commercial information technology products.

Question: If confirmed as DOD's Chief Information Officer, what would you do to ensure that DOD changes the way it does business before it spends new money on automation?

Answer: I understand that the DoD CIO is responsible for promoting improvements to DoD work processes and supportive information resources. IT and process reforms are critically interrelated and represent a major focus for the DoD CIO. If confirmed, I intend to make "business process improvement" a key factor in determining whether to support IT investments. In addition, for reforms to be durable, a clear relationship to the basic business of the Department must be established in the context of a sound enterprise architecture.

#### 17. Defense Information Systems Agency

Over the past several years, a number of concerns have been expressed about the growth in the "tooth-to-tail" ratio and the resource drain that the defense agencies impose on the military services. The Defense Information Systems Agency is often used as an example of how defense agencies continue to grow and continue to absorb resources that should otherwise be dedicated to weapons procurement.

Question: If confirmed, what actions would you take to examine the defense agencies under your jurisdiction to ensure that they are providing the most effective support in the most efficient manner?

<u>Answer</u>: I believe the Defense Information Systems Agency is an example of an entity that has a critical role in this era of information superiority and "the network as a weapons system." The oversight responsibility for defense agencies and activities is a serious charge. If confirmed, I intend to review, scrub, and set serious goals, while applying the best management principles.

#### 18. Joint Command and Control

A recurring theme within the on-going strategic review process is that U.S. Armed Forces lack an agile, deployable joint command and control system. After-action analyses of all major U.S. military operations in the past decade similarly conclude that communications and information technology systems of our respective military services are not fully interoperable.

<u>Question</u>: In your view, what are the major impediments to the development of an interoperable, deployable command and control system for our military forces?

<u>Answer</u>: In my opinion, there are several major impediments:

- 1. Services develop their own Command and Control (C2) systems and there is no process or central engineering authority in place
- 2. There is insufficient joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
- 3. In addition, to these above, the greatest impediment to operating closely with coalition forces are restrictions on national information sharing policies.

If confirmed, I would address these issues and work with Department leaders to resolve them.

<u>Question</u>: What role should ASD C3I play in ensuring the development of reliable and agile command and control systems?

<u>Answer</u>: If confirmed, my role would be to issue policy, planning guidance, and to integrate and oversee service Command and Control acquisition. I firmly believe that OSD, working closely with Congress, the Services, agencies and industry can achieve huge progress in this challenging and critical area of support for our warfighters. If confirmed, I will make this effort a primary goal during my tenure and hold myself personally accountable to achieve measurable progress that I will report annually to Congress.

# 19. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

<u>Question</u>: Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer: Yes.

<u>Question</u>: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)?

Answer: Yes.

<u>Question</u>: Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Answer: Yes.